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Newcomb problems turn on a tension between two principles of choice:
roughly, a principle sensitive to the causal features of the relevant situation,
and a principle sensitive only to evidential factors. Two-boxers give priority
to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs.
A similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather
than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on
credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by
other sorts of probabilistic evidence. Far from excluding cases of the latter
kind, Lewis’s Principal Principle explicitly allows for them, in the form of
the caveat that credences should only follow beliefs about chances in the
absence of “inadmissible evidence”.
In this paper I exhibit a tension in Lewis’s views on these two matters. I
present a class of decision problems – actually, I argue, a species of Newcomb
problem – in which Lewis’s view of the relevance of inadmissible evidence
seems to recommend one-boxing, while his causal decision theory recom-
mends two-boxing. I propose a diagnosis for this dilemma, and suggest a
remedy, based on an extension of a proposal due to Ned Hall and others
from the case of chance to that of causation. The remedy dissolves many
apparent Newcomb problems, and makes one-boxing non-controversial in
those that remain.
 Two decision rules
The original Newcomb problem goes something like this. God offers you the
contents of an opaque box. Next to the opaque box is a transparent box containing
$1,000. God says, “Take that money, too, if you wish. But I should tell you that
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it was Satan who chose what to put in the opaque box. His rule is to put in
$1,000,000 if he predicted that you wouldn’t take the extra $1,000, and nothing
if he predicted that you would take it. He gets it right about 99% of the time.”
Opaque box empty Opaque box filled
Take one box $0 (0.01) $1,000,000 (0.99)
Take both boxes $1,000 (0.99) $1,001,000 (0.01)
Table : The standard Newcomb problem (with evidential probabilities)
Famously, this problem brings to a head a conflict between two decision rules.
In the original presentation of the problem, these rules wereDominance andMax-
imise Expected Utility, but for many purposes it has turned out to be more in-
teresting to represent the disagreement as a clash between two different ways of
calculating expected utility (and hence two different versions of the ruleMaximise
Expected Utility).
Maximise Evidentially-grounded Utility (‘V-utility’):
EV (Acti) = V (O1)Pevidential(O1|Acti) + V (2)Pevidential(O2|Acti)
Maximise Causally-grounded Utility (‘U-utility’):
EU(Acti) = V (O1)Pcausal(O1|Acti) + V (O2)Pcausal(O2|Acti)
Here Pevidential(Oj |Acti) is the “purely epistemic” conditional probability of the
outcome Oj given the act Acti; while Pcausal(Oj |Acti) is what we may call the
causal conditional probability.
It is is a simple matter to show that in the decision problem like that described
above, these two rules give different recommendations. On the one hand,
EV (One-box) = $0× 0.01 + $1,000,000× 0.99
= $990,000
while
EV (Two-box) = $1,000× 0.99 + $1,001,000× 0.01
= $11,010

so that the ruleMaximise V-utility recommends taking only the opaque box. On
the other hand,
EU(Two-box) = $1,000× α+ $1,001,000× (1− α)
= $1,000 + EU(One-box)
(where α = Pcausal(the opaque box is empty)), so that – by Dominance reasoning,
in effect – the rule Maximise U-utility recommends taking both boxes.
Philosophers disagree about which of these two decision rules provides the
rational strategy. Among the famous “two-boxers” is the lion of twentieth century
metaphysics (and my title), David Lewis. Lewis describes the issue as follows:
Some think that in (a suitable version of ) Newcomb’s problem, it is rational
to take only one box. These one-boxers think of the situation as a choice
between a million and a thousand. They are convinced by indicative con-
ditionals: if I take one box I will be a millionaire, but if I take both boxes
I will not. Their conception of rationality may be called V-rationality; they
deem it rational to maximize V, that being a kind of expected utility defined
in entirely non-causal terms. Their decision theory is that of Jeffrey [()].
Others, and I for one, think it rational to take both boxes. We two-boxers
think that whether the million already awaits us or not, we have no choice
between taking it and leaving it. We are convinced by counterfactual con-
ditionals: If I took only one box, I would be poorer by a thousand than I
will be after taking both. . . . Our conception of rationality is U-rationality;
we favor maximizing U, a kind of expected utility defined in terms of causal
dependence as well as credence and value. Our decision theory is that of
Gibbard and Harper [()] or something similar. (Lewis b, )
Elsewhere, Lewis affirms his commitment to two-boxing like this:
[S]ome—I, for one—who discuss Newcomb’s Problem think it is rational
to take the thousand no matter how reliable the predictive process may be.
Our reason is that one thereby gets a thousand more than he would if he
declined, since he would get his million or not regardless of whether he took
his thousand. (Lewis , )
My aim in this paper is to call attention to an apparent tension between this
aspect of Lewis’s views, on the one hand, and his professed position concerning
chance, evidence and rational credence, on the other. In his discussion of the
Principal Principle, Lewis allows that chance does not provide an exceptionless
constraint on rational credence: on the contrary, he holds, an agent who has
access to “inadmissible information” may be rational to allow her credences to be
guided by that information, rather than by her knowledge of the relevant objective
chances. I want to argue that this amounts to endorsing one-boxing, in a particular

class of Newcomb problems; and that there seems to be no principled way of
distinguishing these Newcomb problems from Newcomb problems in general. If
I am right, then Lewis’s commitments about the two matters are in tension with
one another.
In the final section of the paper I suggest a resolution of this tension which
extends a suggestion due to Ned Hall concerning the Principal Principle. Hall
argues that Lewis’s qualification of the Principal Principle to deal with “inadmis-
sible” information is unnecessary and undesirable. Better, Hall argues, to say that
there is no such thing as inadmissible information: properly understood, chance
tracks expert credence in such a way that such cases simply don’t arise. If Hall is
right, the effect is that in my chance-based Newcomb problems, chance-grounded
and evidence-grounded reasoning must coincide – both recommend one-boxing.
I want to point out that Hall’s move is analogous to an option that a number of
people – me, for one – have found attractive in standard Newcomb cases, viz., that
of arguing that where evidential reasoning really does recommend one-boxing,
so too does causal reasoning, properly understood. I think that this approach
can be seen as arguing that causation is best understood as a codification of an
“expert function” for a deliberative agent, in the way that Hall treats chance as a
codification of an expert function for a betting agent – an evidential agent, in both
cases.
In neither case (for chance nor causation) is Hall’s proposal compulsory, in
my view. In either case, we might have grounds – e.g., perhaps, from physics –
to postulate a modal notion which might in principle float free of rational agency,
in unusual cases. But in this eventuality, once we recognise it for what it is, it
will be immediate that the rational policy is to one-box, in the corresponding
Newcomb problems. The apparent force of the Newcomb puzzles derives from
the fact that we have allowed our modal and evidential notions to drift apart in
this way, without being aware of the diagnosis. Once we understand these facts,
we can either eliminate these cases altogether, via Hall’s prescription and its causal
analogue, or we can choose to live with them. But in the latter case the right
option is the one that Lewis grasped in the case of chance: rationality and modal
metaphysics part company, and the rational choice is to one-box.
 A chancy Newcomb problem?
On the face of it, Newcomb problems turn on a conflict between causal beliefs and
evidential beliefs. Hence it is natural to ask whether the same kind of conflict can
arise for other kinds of objective modality. In particular, can it arise for chance?
This is the question that led me into this topic.

It is easy to see that it can. Suppose God offers you the following options on
the toss of what He assures you is a fair coin. Obviously, it is rational to choose to
bet Heads.
Heads Tails
Bet Heads $100 $0
Bet Tails $0 $50
Table : A free lunch?
Now suppose that Satan informs you that although God told you the truth when
He told you that it is a fair coin, he didn’t tell you the whole truth. Of course, you
knew that already. You were well aware that – as in the case of any event governed
by (non-extreme) chances – there is a further truth about the actual outcome of
the coin toss, not entailed by knowledge of the chances.
So you are not impressed by Satan’s revelation. You say, “Tell me something
I didn’t know!” “Okay,” says Satan, rising to the bait, “I betcha didn’t know this.
On those actual occasions on which you yourself bet on the coin, it comes up Tails
about 99% of the time!”
What strategy is rational at this point? Should you assess your expected return
in the light of the objective chances? Or should you avail yourself of Satan’s further
information? Call this the chancy Newcomb problem, or Chewcomb problem, for
short.
Heads Tails
Bet Heads $100 (0.01) $0 (0.99)
Bet Tails $0 (0.01) $50 (0.99)
Table : The Chewcomb problem (with Satanic evidential probabilities)
What is the rational policy in this case? Presumably we should use our rational
credences to calculate the expected values of the available actions, but there are two
views as to what the rational credences are. According to one view, the rational
credences are given to us by our knowledge of the objective chances. In this case,
Satan’s contribution makes no difference to the rational expected utility, and we
should bet Heads, as before. According to the other view, our rational credence
should take Satan’s additional information into account, in which case (as it is easy
to calculate), our rational expected return is $1 if we choose Heads and $49.50 if
we choose Tails.

Which policy should we choose? If we turn for guidance to the masters, we
find that Lewis’s discussion of the constraint that a theory of chance properly
places on rational credence – the discussion in which he formulates the Principal
Principle – seems initially to recommend the second policy in such a case. What
it explicitly recommends – the point of Lewis’s exclusion to the Principal Prin-
ciple for the case in which one take oneself to have “inadmissible evidence” – is
that in such a case one’s rational credences follow one’s beliefs about the new ev-
idence, rather than remaining constrained by one’s theory of chance. Ned Hall’s
exposition of Lewis’s view makes this clear:
Example: we have, on thousands of occasions before this one, consulted
the Oracle about what the chancy future would bring—and every time, her
predictions have been vindicated, in minute detail. This time, she tells us
that the coin will land heads. All of our information is purely historical,
concerning only the record of her past successes, plus her most recent pre-
diction. What should we believe about the outcome of the toss, on the
supposition that it has a % chance of landing heads? Answer: we should
be certain, or nearly so, that it will land heads, favouring the reliable words
of the Oracle over the guidance of objective chance. We should treat the
Oracle as a crystal ball—even though she might merely be lucky, and even
though the evidence guiding our opinions contains no information directly
about the future. (Hall , –)
Or from Lewis himself:
The fatal move that led from Humeanism to contradiction is no better than
the obvious blunder:
C(the coin will fall heads/it is fair and will fall heads in  of the
next  tosses) = /
or even
C(the coin will fall heads/it is fair and it will fall heads) = /.
(Lewis , , my emphasis)
Thus Lewis takes it for granted that someone who takes themselves to have
inadmissible evidence should base their credences on that evidence, rather than
on their beliefs about the relevant chances. In the present case, then, this suggests
that we should assess our options in the Chewcomb problem simply by replac-
ing credences based on chances with credences based on the ‘Satanic’ evidential
probabilities.
We’ll return to Hall’s own view below.

However, it turns out that the Chewcomb problem is just a Newcomb prob-
lem, in (light) disguise; and this policy – the second policy, above – amounts to
one-boxing, when the disguise is removed. So Lewis’s qualification to the Principal
Principle thus seems to be in tension with his allegiance to two-boxing, at least in
certain kinds of Newcomb problem.
In § below I’ll introduce a new Chewcomb problem, which makes more
explicit the fact that Chewcomb problems are a species of Newcomb problem.
But we can already highlight the tension in Lewis’s position in the present case, by
considering this decision problem in the light of Lewis’s own (a) formulation
of causal decision theory. Lewis’s version of CDT depends on a partition K =
{K0,K1, . . . } of “dependency hypotheses”, each of which specifies how what an
agent cares about depends on what she does. The expected U -utility of an act
act A, is then calculated as a sum of the values of each option allowed by this
partition, weighted by the corresponding unconditional probabilities:
U(A) = ΣiP (Ki)V (A&Ki).
Thus in a standard Newcomb problem, where it is specified that the agent has no
causal influence over the contents of the opaque box, the dependency hypotheses
may be taken to be:
K0: The opaque box is empty.
K1: The opaque box contains $1,000,000
We then calculate the causal utilities for taking both both boxes and taking one
box as follows:
U(Two-box) = P (K0)V (Two-box & K0) + P (K1)V (Two-box & K1)
U(One-box) = P (K0)V (One-box & K0) + P (K1)V (One-box & K1).
By dominance reasoning, the result is that U(Two-box) > U(One-box).
If we wish to apply this framework to the Chewcomb problem, the first issue
is what we should take the the dependency hypotheses to be. If we take the causal
structure to follow the structure of the objective chances – i.e., take it that because
the outcome (H or T ) is the result of a toss of fair coin – then the relevant
dependency hypotheses are:
KH : The coin lands Heads
KT : The coin lands Tails.
Whose behaviour isn’t influenced by the way we choose to bet, presumably!

The next issue concerns the probabilities P (KH) and P (KT ). Lewis himself
stresses that if CDT is to remain distinct from EDT, we need to use unconditional
probabilities at this point, not probabilities conditional on action:
It is essential to define utility as we did using the unconditional credences
C(K) of dependency hypotheses, not their conditional credence C(K|A).
If the two differ, any difference expresses exactly that news-bearing aspect
of the options that we meant to suppress. Had we used the conditional
credences, we would have arrived at nothing different from V . (a, )
This means that if we set up the example so that Satan’s inadmissible evidence
yields unconditional probabilities, Lewis can consistently allow that CDT yields
the recommendation to bet on Tails. But it doesn’t have to be set up like this.
We can specify that the information that we learn from Satan doesn’t tell us that
P (KH) = .01, for example, but only that P (KH |Bet T ) = .01.
If this isn’t already clear, we can easily modify the example to make it explicit.
As I set things up above, Satan’s information concerns the class of cases in which
the agent bets at all (either on H or T ) – and it might be argued this yields an
unconditional probability for an agent who already knows herself to be taking
part in the game. However, if we specify that the agent has a third choice – viz.,
not to bet at all – then the situation is unambiguously of the new sort (i.e., it
involves conditional probabilities). In this case, Satan’s information certainly con-
cerns a “news-bearing aspect” (as Lewis puts it) of the act of choosing to bet rather
than not to bet. Accordingly, Lewis’s CDT then seems to require that we use
P (KH) = P (KT ) = 0.5 for calculating U(Bet H), U(Bet T ) and U(No bet),
for there are no other unconditional probabilities available. The upshot is that
CDT recommends the first of the two policies we distinguished above: it recom-
mends betting on H , on the grounds (i) that H pays a higher return, and (ii)
that KH and KT are taken to be equally likely, in the only sense this decision theory
allows to be relevant.
We thus have two versions of the Chewcomb game, the Conditional and the
Unconditional version, where the difference consists in the availability of the No
Bet option. The problem for Lewis takes the form of a trilemma (see Table ). If
he recommendsH in both cases, the unconditional case appears to be in violation
of his own policy on the relevance of inadmissable evidence. If he recommends T
in both cases, the conditional case appears to be in violation of his own version of
CDT. While if he recommends different policies in each case, the difference itself
seems implausible. After all, the case has been set up so that it seems obvious that
a rational agent will choose to bet – it’s a free lunch. And the mixed case seems to
yield different recommendations, depending on whether the agent is allowed first
to choose to bet and then to choose which bet, or has to make both choices at the
same time.

Unconditional Conditional Problem for Lewis
Heads Heads Conflict with policy on inadmissable evidence
Tails Heads Implausible difference in recommendations
Tails Tails Conflict with CDT
Table : Two Chewcomb games – policies and problems.
So, as I say, there seems to be a tension here, from Lewis’s point of view.
I offer the following diagnosis of the difficulty. Newcomb problems are deci-
sion problems in evidential policies seem to give different recommendations from
causal policies, and CDT is the decision theory that cleves to the causal side of
the tracks. Cases of inadmissible evidence are cases in which chance-based cre-
dences lead to different recommendations from (total-)evidence-based credences,
and Lewis takes it for granted that the rational policy is to cleve to the evidential
side of the tracks. Chewcomb problems are decision problems in which both these
things happen at once. It follows that the two kinds of cleving are liable to yield
different recommendations in these cases. At least, they are liable to do so as long
as our causal judgements cleve to our judgements about objective chance . . . but
to give that up – to allow, instead, that causal judgements might properly follow
the “merely evidential” path – would be to abolish the very distinction on which
Newcomb problems rely (or at least to move in that direction).
Lewis himself seems to have been aware that cases like the Chewcomb prob-
lem lead to special difficulties. In the paper in which he presents his own version
of CDT, he compares it to several earlier proposals by other writers. One of these
proposals had been presented in unpublished work by Sobel, and Lewis’s discus-
sion of Sobel’s theory closes with the following remarks:
But [Sobel’s] reservations, which would carry over to our version, entirely
concern the extraordinary case of an agent who thinks he may somehow have
foreknowledge of the outcomes of chance processes. Sobel gives no reason, and I
know of none, to doubt either version of the thesis except in extraordinary
cases of that sort. Then if we assume the thesis, it seems that we are only
setting aside some very special cases – cases about which I, at least, have no
firm views. (I think them much more problematic for decision theory than
the Newcomb problems.) So far as the remaining cases are concerned, it is
satisfactory to introduce defined dependency hypotheses into Sobel’s theory
and thereby render it equivalent to mine. (Lewis, a, , my emphasis)
However, I don’t know whether Lewis saw the difficulty that these cases pose
for his own views – a difficulty that turns on a tension between his attitude to the
relation between causal judgements and evidential judgements, on the one hand,

and chance judgements and evidential judgements, on the other. Nor do I know
whether he saw the fact that serves to highlight this difficulty, viz., that these cases
are themselves a species of Newcomb problem.
 Making the analogy closer
I referred to the Chewcomb problem above as a Newcomb problem in light dis-
guise. Let’s remove the disguise. Suppose God offers you the contents of an
opaque box, to be collected tomorrow. He informs you that the box will then
contain $0 if a fair coin to be tossed at midnight lands Heads, and $1,000,000 if
it lands Tails. Next to it is a transparent box, containing $1,000. God says,“You
can have that money, too, if you like.” At this point Satan whispers in your ear,
saying, "Psssst! It is definitely a fair coin, but my crystal ball tells me that in 99%
of cases in which people choose to one-box in this game, the coin actually lands
Tails.”
Heads Tails
Take one box $0 (0.01) $1,000,000 (0.99)
Take two boxes $1,000 (0.99) $1,001,000 (0.01)
Table : A better free lunch?
Assuming you are convinced that both God and Satan are telling the truth,
what is the rational decision policy in this case? Here the evidential and causal
recommendations seem to be exactly as in the original Newcomb problem, as pre-
sented above. Your action will not have any causal influence on whether there is
money in the opaque box, apparently. How could it do so, when that is deter-
mined by the result of a toss of a fair coin? To say that the chances are 50/50 is
surely to say that nothing prior to the toss can have a causal effect on the outcome.
Lewis also notes the difficulty posed by these cases in correspondence with Wlodek Rabinowicz
in , saying:
It seems to me completely unclear what conduct would be rational for an agent in
such a case. Maybe the very distinction between rational and irrational conduct
presupposes something that fails in the abnormal case. (Lewis, : )
(He goes on to give a nice example of such a case.) I am grateful to Howard Sobel for alerting me
to the existence of this correspondence, and to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Stephanie Lewis and the Estate
of David K. Lewis, for giving me access to it.
In the next section I suggest an understanding of causation which challenges this claim, but the
moment I simply want to point out that someone who says that the agent has no causal influence
on the contents of the opaque box in the standard Newcomb problem, should say exactly the same
here.

Yet you have (or, what is relevant here, you believe yourself to have) evidence of a
strong evidential correlation between your action and the result of the coin toss,
such that you are much more likely to get rich if you one-box.
In this case there is no unconditional version of the game, to highlight the
tension in Lewis’s position in the way that we did above. (The parallel with the
original Newcomb problem depends on the fact that the high evidential prob-
ability of money in the opaque box is conditional on the agent’s only choosing
that box.) However, a similar effect can be achieved in a different way. Suppose
that the agent makes her choice by choosing a ticket – the one-box ticket, or the
two-box ticket – and is then free to sell the ticket and associated expected returns
on the open market. How much is each ticket worth, to someone who has access
to the inadmissible evidence provided by Satan? Lewis’s policy concerning inad-
missible evidence dictates that the one-box ticket would be more valuable than
the two-box ticket; and hence that an agent with access to this option has a clear
reason to one-box. But if the market value of the ticket is itself based on rational
expectations, how could the addition of this factor make a difference to the ra-
tionality of the original choice? Without such a difference, the policy concerning
inadmissible evidence leads to a recommendation in tension with CDT.
 One-boxing the Hall way?
Ned Hall (, ) recommends that we replace Lewis’s Principal Principle
with a new principle, requiring that rational credences track conditional chances:
chances given our evidence. On the face of it, this may seem to eliminate the
problem cases. What matters isn’t simply the chance of the coin coming up Tails,
but the chance of it doing so given the extra information that Satan has whis-
pered in our ear. On the face of it, then, this seems to be irenic resolution of
the dilemma posed by the Chewcomb problems: they are pseudo-problems, arti-
facts of a mistaken rule for aligning credence with one’s beliefs about chance: in
one sense a victory for evidentialism, but a face-saving victory for the evidential-
ists’ opponents, too, in that it maintains that they never had any good reason to
disagree.
Like many irenic proposals, however, this one is a little too good to be true.
To see this, we only have to imagine a proponent of a view of chance according
to which it makes no difference what Satan whispers in one’s ear: the real meta-
We could make the analogy with the original Newcomb problem even tighter, by specifying
that the coin toss (which determines whether the opaque box contains $1,000,000) has already
taken place, when the agent makes her choice. (She does not yet have access to the result, of course.)
Or the information that he has done so, perhaps.

physical chance of a fair coin’s landing Tails is independent of such supernatural
vocalisations (our objector insists), and so the shift to conditional chances makes
no difference. In such a case, it remains an issue whether rational (conditional)
credence should be guided by chance alone, or by other kinds of information.
I think that the real relevance of Hall’s treatment of the Principal Principle to
our present concerns lies in a different feature. Drawing (as he notes) on earlier
proposals by Gaifman () and van Fraassen (, –), Hall suggests that
“chance plays the role of an expert”:
Why should chance guide credence? Because—as far as its epistemic role is
concerned—chance is like an expert in whose opinions about the world we
have complete confidence. (, )
In his () paper Hall elaborates on this idea by distinguishing two kinds of
expert—roughly, the kind of expert (a “database-expert”, as Hall puts it) who
simply knows a lot, and
the kind of expert who earns that status not because she is so well-informed,
but rather because she is extremely good at evaluating the relevance (to claims
drawn from the given subject matter) of different possible bits of evidence.
(, )
“Let us call the second kind an analyst-expert,” Hall continues. ”[S]he earns her
epistemic status because she is particularly good at evaluating the relevance of one
proposition to another.” (, ) Hall takes chance to be the second kind of
expert: “I claim that chance is an analyst-expert.” (, )
Thus for Hall it simply becomes a matter of definition that chance and reason-
able credence cannot come apart, once we have conditionalised on all the available
evidence (including, in particular, what Lewis treats as “inadmissible” evidence).
And it is this stipulation, rather than the conditionalisation move itself, that finally
ensures that there cannot be a genuine Chewcomb problem – a genuine case in
which chance and evidential reasoning come into conflict. Failure to condition-
alise certainly gives rise to one class of (apparent) Chewcomb problems, and Hall’s
diagnosis correctly eliminates those. As we observed a moment ago, however, the
conditionalisation move does not deal with a second class of potential Chewcomb
problems, viz., those in which a metaphysical view of chance simply “disconnects”
from expert credence (conditional on all the evidence, in each case).
I’ve stressed this point because it is the latter aspect of Hall’s view that seems
to me analogous to (what I find) an attractive resolution of the original Newcomb
I think that the possibility of this objection is obscured in Hall’s () discussion of “crystal
balls” by his failure to treat the case in which the ball’s prediction is itself probabilistic in nature, as
in my Satanic example.

case. In Hall’s terminology, it is the view that causal judgments should be regarded
as the judgments of experts about effective strategies, where these are a matter
of maximising conditional V-utility (properly asssessed from the agent’s point of
view). Once again, the effect is to support one-boxing, but to see this as what
maximising U-utility recommends, too, when causal dependence is seen for what
it really is.
We can develop the analogy very directly using our Chewcomb example. The
original argument for the causal independence of the outcome (Heads or Tails)
on our choice of one or two boxes was that in either case, the chance of Heads
and Tails remains the same. (How could we exert a causal influence, we reasoned,
if we couldn’t influence the chances of the outcomes concerned?) According to
Hall’s prescription, however, the conditional chance of Tails given one-boxing is
higher than conditional chance of Tails given two-boxing (and higher than the
conditional chance of Heads given one-boxing). And since we can choose which
antecedent to “actualise” in these various conditional chances, we can also influ-
ence the resulting unconditional chance, in the obvious sense. Thus the intuitive
connection between chance and causation now works in the opposite direction.
It suggests that we do have influence and causation – in particular, causal depen-
dence of States on Acts – in the sense of those terms that now seems appropriate,
given that chance is to be understood as an expert function.
In neither case is Hall’s proposal or its causal analogue compulsory, in my view.
In either case (for chance or for causation) we might have grounds – e.g., perhaps,
from physics – to postulate a modal notion which could drift apart from expert
credence and strategy, in unusual cases. But in this eventuality, once we recognise
it for what it is, it will be immediate that the rational policy is to one-box, in the
corresponding Newcomb problems.
The apparent force of the Newcomb puzzles seems to derive from the fact that
we have allowed our modal and evidential notions to drift apart in this way, with-
out being aware of the diagnosis. Once we understand these facts, we can either
eliminate these cases altogether, via Hall’s prescription and its causal analogue, or
we can choose to live with them. But in the latter case there is no real dilemma.
The right option, trivially, is the one that Lewis grasped in the case of chance: ra-
tionality and modal metaphysics part company (and rationality follows rationality
– what else? – rather than metaphysics). There may be other puzzles and surprises
in the vicinity: a puzzle that rationality and some kind of metaphysics do not keep
step, in some sense, in the way that we have come to expect; or a puzzle about how
there can be an expert function at all, of the chance or the causation variety, in a
world of a certain kind. But these are not the original puzzle of the Newcomb
Another very interesting kind of puzzle that certainly survives these conclusions concerns the

problem, which seems to evaporate from this perspective, along with the problem
of inadmissible evidence.
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nature of the rational expert’s recommendation, in difficult cases. Some people – I, for one (Price
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Appendix
With the kind permission of Wlodek Rabinowicz, Stephanie Lewis and the Estate
of David K. Lewis, the following pages reproduce correspondence between Rabi-
nowicz and Lewis in ; including the letter from Lewis dated March , to
which I referred in fn.  above.
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